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Notes
Liability Insurers Get a Fair Deal
Easley v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co?
I. INTRODUCTION

Public policy does not allow insurance against the results of intentional
acts.2 Thus, most liability insurance contracts contain a clause that excludes
coverage for bodily injury or property damage intended or expected as a result
of an insured's actions These clauses are generally referred to as "intentional acts exclusion clauses" or "intentional injury exclusion clauses."4 Insurance
companies invoke these clauses to deny coverage when they believe an
intentional act of their insured has caused the damages giving rise to the
claim. They cite them to justify declining to provide a defense or defending
with a reservation of rights.5 Difficulties arise in interpreting and applying
these clauses. The real question in all cases is what the insurer must show to
invoke the exclusion. There are two basic requirements: (1) The act done
was intended; and (2) there was some intent for the act to cause injury. Most
courts agree that the act must have been intentional from the standpoint of the
insured. Courts are split, however, on the question of the level of intent that
must be shown regarding the injury that results from the act.6
There are three general approaches to this issue. The majority rule
requires a showing of specific intent to act and to cause harm. In certain

cases, however, intent to harm can be inferred from the nature of the act
itself.7 Some states follow an objective rule that once intent to do the act is
1. Easley v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 847 S.W.2d 811 (Mo. Ct. App.
1992).
2. Easley, 847 S.W.2d at 812; GEORGE COUCH 11 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D
§ 44:285 (Rev. Ed. 1982); ROBERT E. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW,

286-87 (1971). This public policy is codified in section 533 of the California
Insurance Code. CAL INS. CODE § 553 (West 1993).
3. KEETON, supra note 2, at 286, 288-89; COUCH, supra note 2, § 44:287.
4. James L' Rigelhaupt Jr., Annotation, ConstructionandApplicationofProvision
of Liability Insurance Policy Expressly Excluding Injuries Intended or Expected by
Insured,31 A.L.R. 4th 957, 969-70 (1984).
5. Nathan Z. Cyperstein, Coverage for Intentionally Caused Unintended
Consequences,FOR THE DEFENSE, Feb. 1993 at 18, 19.
6. Rigelhaupt, supra note 4, at 973-74.
7. Constance M. Alvey, Note, IntentionalInjury Exclusion: American Family
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shown, all reasonably foreseeable results are deemed intended and thus
excluded from policy coverage.' The most restrictive test is the subjective
intent test,9 under which an insurer must prove that the insured had the
subjective intent to commit an act and had the subjective intent to cause the
exact harm that results or a similar type of harm.'0 This standard is the most
difficult to meet, and unless the insured admits that he intended the actual
harm that resulted, the insurer is often stuck covering acts it believed it had
excluded by the policy language.
Missouri was a specific intent state" until the decision in American
Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Pacchetti. After this split opinion of the
Missouri Supreme Court, it was thought Missouri had become a subjective
intent state.' 3 The first three decisions to try to follow Pacchetti had to
strain to do so, however,14 and arguably they demonstrated the difficulty in
applying the subjective intent test. Easley v. American Family Mutual
Insurance Co.'5 moves the law back to the center, where it was before
Pacchetti,and provides a more reasonable and logical test for courts to use
when dealing with these exclusionary clauses.

Mutual Insurance Co. v. Pacchetti,60 UMKC L. REV. 559, 562 (1992). There is a

particular subclass of inferred intent cases both in Missouri and nationwide dealing
with injuries from the sexual abuse of children. In all of these cases, the courts have
found that the sexual abuse of children is such a harmful act that injury is sure to
result, and therefore intent is inferred as a matter of law. The insurer can successfully
invoke the intentional acts exclusion clause in these cases. Mid-Century Ins. Co. v.
L.D.G., 835 S.W.2d 436, 439-44 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (Hanna, J., concurring). This
subclass of abuse cases illustrates the inferred intent concept, which will not be
discussed in this Note because of the unique nature of the crime and its treatment by
society.
8. Kristin Wilcox, Comment, Intentional Injury Exclusion Clauses-What is
InsuranceIntent?, 32 WAYNE L. REV. 1523, 1534 (1986).
9. This is the term used by this Note to describe the required level of intent.
Several other terms are also used to describe this type of intent. See Alvey, supranote
7, at 561-62.
10. Alvey, supra note 7, at 561.
11. See infra notes 49-134 and accompanying text.
12. 808 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. 1991).
13. See infra notes 157-195 and accompanying text.
14. Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. L.D.G., 835 S.W.2d 436 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992);
American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lacy, 825 S.W.2d 306 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991);
Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. Haste, 824 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
15. 847 S.W.2d 811 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING

This case arose out of a simple schoolyard fight. On January 24, 1984,
Shawn Easley and Douglas Willmeno had an argument during high school
basketball practice at New Bloomfield High School. 6 After practice,
Willmeno waited outside the school building for Easley." When Easley left
the building, Willmeno approached Easley and hit him on the chin with his
fist. 8 Easley fell back against a wall of the building, bounced off at a 90
degree angle, and fell into a plate glass window. 9 His head went through
the window; his neck was cut severely and his left ear was almost severed.20
Shawn Easley, through his next friend Charles Easley (his father), filed
suit against Doug Wilmeno on January 30, 1987.21 American Family was
notified of the suit because they had a valid mobile home owners insurance
policy issued to Sandra Willmeno, Doug Wilmeno's mother, which also
This policy provided a fifty-thousand dollar liability
covered her son.'
coverage for personal injury and property damage. 3 However, it also had
American Family's standard exclusion clause denying coverage for "bodily
injury or property damage ... which is expected or intended by any

insured."' Based on this exclusion, American Family declined to provide
a defense for Doug Willmeno.
Easley obtained ajudgment against Wilmeno for $82,088.14.' He then
instituted a garnishment proceeding27 against American Family to recover the

16. 1I at 811.
17. Id.
18. Id
19. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 3, Easley v. American Family
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Willmeno, Case No. CV589-493, Circuit Court of Callaway County,
Missouri (Judgment entered Nov. 27, 1991).
20. Id

21. Id at 1. The case was Easley v. Willmeno, Case No. CV5-85-32, Circuit
Court of Callaway County, Missouri.
22. Easley, 847 S.W.2d at 812; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2,
Easley v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., Case No CV589-493, Circuit Court of

Callaway County, Missouri.
23. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2, Easley v. American Family
Mut. Ins. Co., Case No. CV589-493, Circuit Court of Callaway County, Missouri.
24. Easley, 847 S.W.2d at 812.
25. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2, Easley v. American Family
Mut. Ins. Co., Case No. CV589-493, Circuit Court of Callaway County, Missouri.
26. Id Judgment was entered on September 11, 1989 in the underlying case of
Easley v. Willmeno. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
27. Pursuant to Mo. REV. STAT. § 379.200 (1986).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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amount of judgment against the Wilimeno's insurance policy.28 American
Family impleaded Sandra and Doug Willneno as third-party defendants. 9
0
Easley and American Family filed cross motions for summary judgment1
The trial court held that the American Family policy covered the injuries to
Easley.3 Based on the trial court's reading of American Family Mutual
32 it held that American
Insurance Co. v. Pacchetti,
Family had the burden
of proving that Willmeno had intended the specific injury that resulted from
his act.33 The trial court found that Wilimeno did not intend to knock Easley
toward or through the window, or to cause the injuries that resulted. 4 It
held that American Family had shown only that Willmeno intended to strike
Easley and blacken his eye or give him a bloody nose, not that he intended the
specific injuries that resulted.35 Thus, the intentional acts exclusion clause
was inapplicable and judgment was entered for Easley.36
American Family appealed, arguing that Willmeno could have reasonably
predicted that striking Easley hard enough to give him a black eye or bloody
lip could cause Easley to be knocked down or strike something causing further
bodily injury.3" Because Wilimeno intended to strike Easley and intended
to cause him harm, and reasonably foreseeable injuries resulted, American
Family argued that the intentional act exclusion clause prohibited coverage. 8
Easley countered that under the rule of Pacchetti and Economy Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Haste,39 American Family had failed to show that Willmeno
intended the specific result of his act, and thus the exclusionary clause did not
bar coverage. 4° The Western District of the Missouri Court of Appeals,
sitting en banc, reversed41 and entered summary judgment for American

28. Easley, 847 S.W.2d at 812.
29. Id
30. Id
31. Id
32. 808 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. 1991).
33. Easley, 847 S.W.2d at 812.
34. Id
35. Id
36. Id.; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 4, Easley v. American Family
Mut. Ins. Co., Case No. cu5-85-32, Circuit Court of Callaway County Missouri.
Judgment was in the amount of $50,000 plus interest of $16,478.20, and court costs
were assessed to American Family. Id
37. Appellant's Brief at 7, 10, Easley v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., WD No.
45,688 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
38. Id at 10-12.
39. 824 S.W.2d 41.(Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
40. Easley, 847 S.W.2d at 813.
41. Id. at 814. The Honorable Paul M. Spinden wrote the opinion in which all
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Family.42 The court held that the trial court had read Pacchettitoo narrowly.
According to the court of appeals, all that is required to invoke the exclusion
is that an intent to injure be shown.43 Because American Family had shown
Willmeno's intent to strike and injure Easley, and because the public policy
of Missouri prohibits insuring against the consequences of intentional acts, the
Western District held that American Family could invoke the intentional acts
exclusion clause in its policy to deny coverage to Doug Willmeno.4

Il. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Missouri Cases Before Pacchetti
Missouri courts first tried to define the term "intentional" for purposes of
these policy exclusions in Crull v. Gleb.4" Gleb caught Crull dumping debris
in a drainage ditch.' Gleb, in his pickup, chased Crull's car down the road,
rammed him four times, and blocked him in a driveway.47 Gleb claimed that
the ramming was accidental in that his foot slipped off the clutch causing him
to lose control of the truck.48 The EasternDistrict Court of Appeals said that
the only real issue for the jury in the subsequent jury action was whether
Gleb's actions were "intentional." If so, the insurer was not liable.49 The
court defined "intentional" as "mean[ing] deliberately and consciously
intending, or meaning, to do the acts themselves, knowing that they were
wrong, and intending that harm result from said acts."5 However, the case
was submitted with jury instructions providing for "wanton and reckless"
acts.5" The court defined these terms to mean acts done deliberately but
without regard for the consequences.5 2 Since these acts could include
negligent acts,53 the insurer could not invoke the policy exclusion.'

concurred. Id
42. Id.
43. Id. at 812-13.
44. Id at 814.
45. 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
46. Id. at 19.
47. Id
at 21.
48. Id.
49. Id at 21.
50. Id
51. Id at 20-21.
52. Id
53. Id. at 22.
54. Id
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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The next case looking at intentional acts exclusion clauses was in the
Southern District-FarmersAlliance Mutual Insurance Co. v. Reed.5 While
driving drunk, Reed twice collided with the car of J.D. Hendrix, forcing him
off the road. 6 The court first held that the trial court had jurisdiction to hear
a declaratory judgment action by Farmers Alliance Mutual Insurance Company
to construe the application of an intentional acts exclusion." In deciding
what must be shown to invoke an intentional acts exclusion, the court cited an
annotation on the subject entitled "LiabilityInsurance: Specific Exclusion of
Liabilityfor Injury Intentionally Caused by Insured."8 The court quoted a

paragraph detailing what has come to be called the specific intent approach to
construing these exclusions. 9 The quoted paragraph said that an insurer is
not relieved of its obligations unless the insured acted with the specific intent
to cause harm to the third party.' However, some acts are such that the
intent to harm can be inferred from the character of the acts, thus relieving the
insurer of liability.6'
In 1977, the Eastern District tried to clearly define this area of law by
adopting the specific intent test and rejecting the subjective intent approach.
In Subscribers at the Automobile Club Inter-Insurance Exchange v.
Kennison,62 the Auto Club instituted a declaratory judgment action to deny
coverage to its insured, Bobby Joe Brown.' Kennison blocked Brown's lane
with his car in a parking lot." When Brown told Kennison to move,
Kennison responded "you make me move it."6 Brown then backed up and
rammed into Kennison's car.' The Eastern District cited Crull, Reed, and
the annotation cited in Reed, in its discussion of the requirements for showing
that an insured intended the results of his acts.67 The court followed Crull
in holding that there must be specific intent to cause harm or damage, and that
"[i]ntended results are not only those results which are desired."68 The court
cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts for the proposition that intent can be

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

530 S.W.2d 470 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
Id. at 477-78.
Id at 477.
W.E. Merritt III, 2 A.L.R. 3d 1238 (1965).
Reed, 530 S.W.2d at 478.
Id.
Id
549 S.W.2d 587, 591 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
Id at 589.
Id
Id
Id
Id at 590-91.
Id at 590.
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inferred if the nature of the act is such that the results are certain or
substantially certain to occur.69 The court also cited a Tenth Circuit case,
Rankin v. FarmersElevator Mutual Insurance Co.,7" for the rule that if the
results are the natural and probable consequences of an intentional act, then

the results are deemed to be intentional.7' The court concluded by stating

that intent to harm can be inferred from the nature of the act.72 The court
said that "[t]o hold otherwise, would... establish a subjective standard of
intent which would make intentional injury liability insurance exclusions
inapplicable without an admission by the insured of specific intent to
injure."'
Thus, although Kennison adopted the specific intent test, the
court's wording opened the door for insurers to argue for the use of the
objective test to exclude "natural and probable" results of acts.
The next case in this line contained an explicit statement of the limits of
exclusions used by American Family in its brief to the Court of Appeals in the
Easley case. 74 Hanover Insurance Co. v. Newcomer75 dealt with the
injuries to a woman inflicted by a drunk friend, who was swinging a machete
around when he hit her in the leg.76 Hanover brought a declaratory judgment
action claiming that the blow to the victim was intentional, and thus the injury
was intentional. 77 Newcomer claimed that he had struck the victim by
accident. 78 The court reviewed the decision in Kennison, and because the
policy language in the two cases was different, it undertook a survey of the
trends nationwide in this area of law.79 The Western District adopted the
rule of State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Muth," Continental Western
Insurance Co. v. Toal,81 and Butler v. Behaege.82 The court rejected a
distinction between the terms "expected" and "intended," saying that to do so
would allow foreseeability to be injected into the test and thus allow

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs, § 8A).
70. 393 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1968).
71. Kennison, 549 S.W.2d at 590-91.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Appellant's Brief at 7, Easley v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., WD No.
45,688 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
75. 585 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
76. Id at 285-86.
77. Id. at 286-87.
78. Id at 287.
79. Id at 287-89.
80. 207 N.W.2d 364 (Neb. 1973).
81. 244 N.W.2d 121 (Oinn. 1976).
82. 548 P.2d 934 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976).

69. Id (citing
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negligence to be excluded under the policy language. 3 Instead, the court
adopted the rule that intent to injure can be inferred if the nature and character
of the act is such that injury can be expected."4 The court explicitly stated
that "such exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or
expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that
does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that
was intended."85
Curtain v. Aldrich86 was a case involving an assault based on mistaken
identity.87 Because it was a mistaken identity case, the legal analysis was a
little different from the three previous intentional acts exclusion cases, but the
court ultimately held that if Aldrich had assaulted Curtain with the intent to
injure, knowing who Curtain was, the injuries were intentional and beyond the
scope of policy coverage.8" The court reaffirmed the rule that public policy
denies indemnity insurance for intentional acts. 9
In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Cole,9' Travelers Insurance instituted a
declaratory judgment action to determine whether it was liable for its insured's
act of shooting a police officer.9' The trial court found that the shooting was

not an "occurrence" because the policy language prohibited intentional acts

from being "occurrences," and the Eastern District affirmed. 2 The court said
that language excluding injury or damage expected or intended from the
standpoint of the insured necessarily excludes coverage for the insured's
intentional acts.' The court defined an injury as intentional when "the
insured acts with the specific intent to cause harm or if the insured's intent to
harm is inferred as a matter of law from the nature or character of the act."94
Intent is inferred if "the natural and probable consequences of an act are to
produce harm."9" The court then found that discharging a gun is a dangerous
act from which harm is certain to result, and so it was proper to infer intent

83. Hanover, 585 S.W.2d at 288.
84. Id. at 289.
85. Id at 288. (quoting Butler v. Behaege, 548 P.2d 934, 938 (Colo. Ct. App.
1976)); also cited in Appellant's Brief at 7.
86. 589 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
87. Id at 62-63.
88. Id at 66.
89. Id at 64.
90. 631 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
91. Id at 663.
92. Id at 663-64.
93. Id. at 664.
94. Id
95. Id
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss1/14
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to harm. 6 In this case, the plaintiff in the underlying suit had also pleaded
one count alleging negligence.' The court said that wanton and reckless acts
are those done intentionally but without regard for the consequences; thus,
these acts may be negligent. 8 Insurers may not deny coverage for these
acts.99
In 1982, the Western District again dealt with an exclusion clause in
10 In Pickering, the insured had
Truck Insurance Exchange v. Pickering."
tried to provoke a fight with the driver of a truck who had cut him off.'
When he realized that he was outnumbered by men in the semi, Pickering got

in his car as if he were leaving."

Instead of leaving, however, Pickering

rammed the truck once, backed up, and drove towards the truck, killing one
of the men standing in front of the truck. 3 The survivors of the man killed
argued that the policy language required a subjective determination of intent
before any exclusion could be invoked."° The court cited Kennison"5 for
the rejection of the subjective state of mind standard to prove intent." 6 The
court said that an admission of intent is not needed. 7 It held that it is
possible to infer intent from the facts and circumstances surrounding an act,
and a person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of
her actions." 8 Thus, "[w]hen an intentional act results in injuries which are
the natural and probable consequences of the act,the injuries as well as the act
are intentional. " 9 The court explicitly rejected the subjective intent
standard by saying that to adopt that standard would make it impossible to
preclude coverage without an admission of intent by the insured."'
The Eastern District, in Farm Bureau Town & CountryInsurance Co. of
Missouri v. Turnbo,"' became the first in Missouri to try to define a

96. Id.
97. Id at 664-65.
98. Id
99. Id
100. 642 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
101. Id at 114.
102. Id at 115.
103. Id
104. Id at 115-16.
105. 549 S.W.2d 587 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
106. Pickering,642 S.W.2d at 116.
107. Id
108. Id (citing Camp v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 165 S.W.2d 277, 281
(Mo. Ct. App. 1942)).
109. Pickeing,642 S.W.2d at 116.
110. Id
111. 740 S.W.2d 232, 234-36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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difference between the terms "expected" and "intended." In Turnbo, Farm
Bureau brought a declaratory judgment action to determine its duty to defend
Turnbo for injuries William Humphry suffered in a simple fistfight with
Turnbo."' Humphry sued Turnbo for his injuries on grounds that Turnbo
had acted intentionally and had been reckless."' The Farm Bureau policy
contained language excluding coverage for acts "intended or expected" to
cadse injury.114 The Eastern District recognized that the Western District
had indicated in Hanoverthat the two terms meant the same thing."' The
court declined to follow the Western District, however, because it believed the
two terms were not written to be synonymous. 1 6 It cited the industry-wide
revision of these clauses in 1966 for the idea that the term "expected" was
added specifically to force courts to view the injury from the standpoint of the
insured." 7 The two terms were designed to require different levels of
proof.11 The court held that "'[i]ntend' means the insured desires to cause
the consequences of his act or believes the consequences are substantially

certain to result." 19 It held that "'[e]xpect' means the insured realized or
should have realized there was a strong probability the consequences in
question would result from his acts."' 0 The court then equated "expect"
with the legal definition of recklessness, and determined that in this case, the
exclusion relieved Farm Bureau from having to cover Turnbo even if the
plaintiff pleaded recklessness.'
After Turnbo was decided, the Southern District decided the final two
cases before Pacchetti. In the first, Western Indemnity Co. v. Alley," the
court did not discuss Turnbo in stating that the rule is that "[i]njury is
intentional if the insured acted with specific intent to cause harm. Intent to
harm is usually inferred if the natural and probable consequences of an act
produce harm."'"
However, in Steelman v. Holford,'2 the Southern
District, without comment, followed the Eastern District's separate definitions

112. Id. at 233-34.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 234.
115. Id at 235-36 (citing Hanover Ins. Co. v. Newcomer, 585 S.W.2d 285, 288
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979)).
116. Id. at 236.
117. Id
118. Id
119. Id
120. Id.
121. Id
122. 740 S.W.2d 372 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
123. Id at 374.
124. 765 S.W.2d 372 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss1/14
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2
In Steelman, Holford and a friend went on
of "intended" and "expected.""I
a drunken jeep ride from Jefferson City, Missouri, to Doniphan, Missouri. 26
During the drive, one of the two fired a .30 caliber rifle from the jeep. 2 7
Steelman, who was driving a truck, heard two pops, felt a sharp pain in his
leg, and realized he had been shot.'28 Both Holford and his friend disclaimed any knowledge of shooting the truck or shooting Steelman, nor was
there any evidence they had reason to shoot Steelman or that they had
intentionally fired into the truck. 29 The Southern District cited Turnbo in

holding that to avoid coverage, Home Mutual Insurance Company, Holford's
insurer, had the burden of proving Steelman's injuries were intended or
expected. 3 The court said that to prove Steelman's injuries were intended,
Home Mutual would have to prove that "Holford either desired to cause
Steelman's injury or believed that Steelman's injury was substantially certain
to follow" from the gunshot. 3 ' To prove the injury was expected, Home
Mutual would have to show "that Holford realized, or should have realized,
that there was a strong probability Steelman would be shot as a consequence
of his acts."' 32 The court found that since there was no evidence of
conscious intent to cause the harm that followed, there was no intentional act
The court also said that wanton and reckless acts are
voiding coverage.'
not equivalent to intentional acts, and that an insurer cannot use an intentional
acts clause to void coverage for reckless acts.' 34
B. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Pacchetti
The first time the Missouri Supreme Court dealt with the issues involved
in intentional acts exclusion clauses was in AmericanFamilyMutual Insurance
Co. v. Pacchetti."' The Missouri Supreme Court granted transfer because
of "the widespread use of an exclusion for injuries intended or expected in
liability insurance policies."' 36 Pacchetti was based on a unique factual

125. Id. at377.
126. Id at 375-76.
127. Id at 376. The testimony conflicts as to who was driving and who was
shooting. Id
128. Id at 375.
129. Id. at 376.
130. Id at 377.
131. Id
132. Id.
133. Id
134. Id
135. 808 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. 1991).
136. Id at 370. The court immediately reaffirmed that the "burden is on the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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situation. Sixteen year old Derek Anderson was visiting the defendant,
Charles Pacchetti, when Pacchetti showed him a vial of nearly pure cocaine. 3' When he found out that Anderson had never tried cocaine before,
Pacchetti either injected Anderson with cocaine or furnished the cocaine to
Anderson to inject and/or helped him with the injection.'
Anderson
subsequently collapsed and died of an overdose.'
American Family had
an insurance policy on Pacchetti, insuring him for liability for personal injury
and property damage, that contained American Family's standard exclusion
clause barring coverage of bodily injury "'expected or intended by any
insured."" '
The Missouri Supreme Court, by a four to three vote,' 4 ,
affirmed the trial court's finding that the exclusion was inapplicable as the
injury was neither intended nor expected. 42 The court held that the insurer
could not invoke the exclusion simply by showing that cocaine was harmful
and inferring intent from that alone.' 43 The court also rejected the idea that
a showing of recklessness could satisfy the requirements of an intentional acts
exclusion."4
The court defined the test to be that "[i]t must be shown not only that the

insured intended the acts causing the injury, but that injury was intended or
expected from these acts."'45 In another important passage the court said:
It remains for the insurer to show that this particular insured
expected or intended the result which occurred. The record does
not compel a finding that he did. It is just as likely that
Pacchetti, in his perverted way, might have thought that Derek
would derive some transitory pleasure or benefit from what
would be his initial experience with cocaine. What Pacchetti
146
intended or expected is a question of fact for the trial court.

insurer to establish that an exclusion bars coverage." Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id
141. Id Ulrich, Special Judge, dissented and was joined by Judges Robertson and
Holstein. Id at 372-74.
142. Id at 371-72. Chief Judge Charles Blackmar wrote the opinion of the court.
Id at 370.
143. Id at 371.
144. Id
145. Id.
(citing Steelman v. Holford, 765 S.W.2d 372, 377 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)).
146. Pacchetti, 808 S.W.2d at 371.
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The court concluded by saying that the trial court's findings of fact
regarding Pacchetti's intent were supported by the evidence. 47
Special Judge Ulrich, joined by Judges Robertson and Holstein,
dissented."' Judge Ulrich argued that American Family had presented
evidence that showed Pacchetti intended to cause Derek Anderson's death as
a matter of law, causing the policy exclusion to apply.'49 He drew upon the
traditional Missouri rules that the term "intentional" as "contemplat[ing]
deliberately and consciously intending the acts themselves ....

[and]

requir[ing] a showing that the actor intended that harm result from the
acts.""'5 He stated that "[a]n insured commits an intentional act when he

acts with the specific intent to cause harm to a third person or when the
insured's intent to harm is inferred as a matter of law from the nature or
character of the act." 5' Judge Ulrich argued that the intent of Pacchetti to
harm Anderson could be inferred from the dangerous nature of cocaine. 2
He believed the issue was whether Pacchetti intended some harm to result to
Derek, not whether Pacchetti intended the actual harm that resulted.153 He
surveyed cases from many other states that dealt with the isstie of whether
intent to harm generally is sufficient, or whether intent to cause the actual
resulting harm must be proven."5 Judge Ulrich said he would adopt the rule
from these other jurisdictions that "when the insured commits an intentional
act intending to harm another person, the resulting harm to the person is
intentional though more severe than that originally contemplated by the
insured... [as long as] the resulting harm is the 'ordinary consequence[]' of

147. Id at 371-72.
148. Id at 372.
149. Id

150. Id (citing Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17, 21 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964)).
151. Pacchetti,808 S.W.2d at 372 (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cole, 631 S.W.2d
661, 664 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982), and Hanover Ins. Co. v. Newcomer, 585 S.W.2d 285,
289 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979)).
152. Paccheti,808 S.W.2d at 373.
153. Id.
154. Id. (citing Parkinson v. Farmers Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1039 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1979); Butler v. Behaege, 548 P.2d 934 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976); Hartford Fire Ins. Co.
v. Spreen, 343 So. 2d 649 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Antill v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 344 S.E.2d 480 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986); Farmers Ins. Group v. Sessions, 607 P.2d
422 (Idaho 1980); Mid America Fire v. Smith, 441 N.E.2d 949 (Ill. Ct. App. 1982);
Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240 (nd. Ct. App. 1975); Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co. v. Hill, 314 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. 1982); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Muth, 207
N.W.2d 364 (Neb. 1973); Tal v. Franklin Mut. Ins. Co. 410 A.2d 1194 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1980); Graves v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 745 S.W.2d 282 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1987); Pachucki v. Republic Ins. Co., 278 N.W.2d 898 (Wis. 1979)).
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the insured's voluntary actions." '55 Under this rule, Judge Ulrich determined
that because Pacchetti intended to puncture Derek's arm and put a toxic
chemical into his blood, any harm that resulted was "intended" by Pacchetti,
even if more severe than he contemplated. 56
C. Missouri CasesAfter Pacchetti
The next three cases dealing with these exclusion clauses, Economy Fire
5 7 American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v.
& Casualty Co. v. Haste,"
Lacy, and Mid-Century Insurance Co. v. L.D.G., 59 were all decided by
the Western District. Using the narrow definition of "intentional act" in
Pacchetti,the courts in Haste and Lacy found that the liability policies in
question covered the acts."w However, in L.D.G., coverage was denied
because of slightly different wording in the exclusion clause.'
Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. Haste is better known as the Bob
Berdella case." Families of Berdella's victims brought a civil suit asking
for damages for both wrongful death and for the pre-death injuries Berdella
inflicted on his victims."
Berdella had a homeowners policy with
Economy Fire that had standard personal injury and property damage liability
coverage. 6" This policy contained an exclusion clause denying coverage for
bodily injury expected or intended by Berdella.'" The court followed

Pacchetfiby declaring the rule to be that the burden is on the insurer to show
that the insured "expected or intended the result which occurred" in order to
invoke the exclusion to deny coverage. 67 The court then applied the rule
and declared that the record clearly showed that Berdella expected and
intended to injure his victims with torture and abuse. 6 ' Therefore, the
exclusion applied and there could be no recovery for the pre-death injuries the

155. Pacchetti,808 S.W.2d at 374.
156. Id
157. 824 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
158. 825 S.W.2d 306 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
159. 835 S.W.2d 436 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
160. Haste, 824 S.W.2d at 45; Lacy, 825 S.W.2d at 314-15.
161. L.D.G., 835 S.W.2d at 437-38.
162. 824 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
163. Id Berdella is a serial murderer who sexually tortured and killed his victims
in his home in Kansas City, Missouri. Id at 43-44.
164. Id at 43.
165. Id at 44.
166. Id
167. Id at 45.
168. Id
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victims sustained.'69 However, the court reversed the trial court's summary
judgment for Economy Fire, saying there was a genuine issue of material fact
regarding whether Berdella intended to kill any of his victims. 1 70 The
Western District remanded the case for a determination of whether Berdella
intended to cause his victim's deaths. If he did not intend to kill any of them,
7
Economy Fire's policy would have to provide coverage.1 '
American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Lacy" was a declaratory
judgment action arising out of a car chase and wreck." American Family
insured Timothy Stoffers 74 who ran a stop sign and subsequently refused
to pull over when the police gave chase. 75 At the end of the chase, Stoffers
crested a hill, veered to the left, crossed the center line, and hit a car driven
by John Turner. 76 Stoffers was killed. 77 The American Family policy
contained an exclusion that denied coverage for "[b]odily injury or property
damage caused by an intentional act of... an insured... even if the actual
78
injury or damage is different than that which was expected or intended."
In defining the substantive law governing the interpretation of this exclusion
clause, the court again looked to Pacchettifor the proper definitions.'79 The
court interpreted Pacchetti as requiring that the insurer show the insured
intended the acts causing the injury and that injury was intended or expected
to result in order to invoke the exclusion'8 If a question of fact arises as
to what the insured intended or expected, it "remains for the insurer to show
that this particular insured expected or intended the result which
occurred."' Later in the opinion, the court summarized the rule governing
intentional acts exclusions as being "that the insured intended the act that
caused the injury, and intended or expected the injury from the act."'8
Despite the language of the policy extending the exclusion to cover injury not
intended or expected by the insured, the court held that unintended harm from

169. Id
170. Id
171. Id at 45-47.
172. 825 S.W.2d 306 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
173. Id.
at 308.
174. Id.
175. Id at 310.
176. Id
177. Id.
at 308.
178. Id
179. Id at 314.
180. Id
181. Id.
(quoting Pacchetti,808 S.W.2d at 371).
182. Lacy, 825 S.W.2d at 315 (citing Pacchetti, 808 S.W.2d at 371) (emphasis
in original).
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an intentional act does not fall into the exclusion and is covered by the
"'
policy. 83
Because there was no evidence showing Stoffers could have
intended the results of his acts, the court held summary judgment against the
insurance company was appropriate.' 84
The final post-Pacchetticase before Easley was Mid-Century Insurance
Co. v. L.D.G. "s This case involved the sexual abuse of a two year old
girl. 86 She was raped by Robert McKinney, the husband of her babysitter,
and she contracted chiamydia as a result.8 7 McKinney claimed he was
unaware that he was a chlamydia carrier.'88 His insurance policy, issued by
Mid-Century, contained an exclusion clause for bodily injury either caused
intentionally or that is the reasonably foreseeable result of an intentional
act."89
' The court followed the definition in Pacchettithat "[ilt remains for
the insurer to show that this particular insured expected or intended the result
which occurred.'
Under this test, the court held that there was no
showing on the record that McKinney intended to give L.D.G. chlamydia as
a result of the rape.' 9' Therefore, the policy exclusion could not be invoked
on the grounds that McKinney's acts and the result were intentional."
However, the exclusion clause also contained language barring coverage for

reasonably foreseeable results of an intentional act. 93 The court held that
the transmission of a venereal disease as the result of a rape could be
considered reasonably foreseeable as a matter of law, and thus this provision
of the Mid-Century clause excluded coverage of McKinney.' Judge Hanna
concurred in a lengthy and thorough opinion, arguing that the majority should
have adopted a rule that under Pacchetti,the sexual abuse of children was so

183. Lacy, 825 S.W.2d at 315 n.7. The court engaged in an analysis of what
"intentional" meant. Id at 314-15. The court seemed to decide that despite the policy
language, an injury that was not intended or substantially certain to result from the
insured's acts was not "intentional," and thus was covered by the policy. Id.
184. Id. at 315.
185. 835 S.W.2d 436 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
186. Id at 436.
187. Id
188. Id
189. Id at 436-37.
190. Id at 437 (citing Pacchetti,808 S.W.2d at 371). Interestingly, Judge Ulrich
wrote for the majority in this case, after writing the dissent in Pacchelliobjecting to
this subjective intent standard.
191. L.D.G., 835 S.W.2d at 437.
192. Id
193. Id at 437-38.
194. Id at 438.
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harmful that any injury resulting would be inferred to be intentional, and thus
excludable from policy coverage."'
Thus, based on the Western District's interpretation of Pacchettiin these
three cases, the subjective intent standard was the law in Missouri. Because
of the language in Pacchettithe panels had cited, an insurer had to show that
their insured intended his act and intended the precise result that had occurred,

in order to invoke an intentional acts exclusion clause.
IV.

INSTANT DECISION

In Easley v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co."9 the Western
District of the Missouri Court of Appeals, sitting en bane, reversed the trial
court's declaration that Willmeno's policy covered Easley's injuries."s The
court began its analysis by noting that Missouri courts have consistently held
that the intentional infliction of damage cannot be covered by liability
insurance. 9 Allowing insurance to cover these intentional acts would be
against Missouri's public policy and would prevent an insured from bearing
the responsibility for his acts.'
The court summarized the trial court's finding that Willmeno did not
intend to knock Easley towards the window or cause the injuries Easley
sustained.2" The trial court held, based on Pacchetti, that an insurer can
only be relieved of liability when it shows that the insured intended the
specific injury that resulted.2 ' Because American Family had shown only
that Willmeno wanted to give Easley a black eye or a bloody nose and not
knock him through the window and cause the specific injuries that resulted,
according to.the trial court, the exclusion clause did. not apply.2"
The en bane court concluded that the trial court had read Pacchettitoo
narrowly. 3 The court said:
We read it [Pacchetti]as instructing that an insurer can escape
liability for intentional acts when it establishes not only that the

195. Id at 438-44.
196. 847 S.W.2d 811 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
197. Id at 812.
198. Id
199. Id (citing Keeler v. Farmers & Merchants Ins. Co., 724 S.W.2d 307, 309
(Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Wrather, 652 S.W.2d
245 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); White v. Smith, 440 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969)).
200. Id. at 812.
201. Id.
202. Id
203. Id
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insured acted intentionally, but that the insured intended his acts
to injure-not benefit-the victim. The insurer must establish
that the insured acted volitionally and with a motive to harm or
injure. The Pacchetticourt was not requiring a showing that the
insured intended the specific injury which resulted.2° 4
The source of confusion in how to read Pacchetti comes from two passages
on page 371 of the opinion.0 5 The first relevant passage states:
The insurer... does not automatically bring the exclusion into
play simply by showing that cocaine is harmfiul, or that the
insured's acts in providing it ... were intentional. Many
intentional acts are within the coverage of liability insurance
policies, even with this standard exclusion. It must be shown
not only that the insured intended the acts causing the injury, but
20 6
that injury was intended or expected from these acts.
The second relevant passage the Western District quoted states:
It remains for the insurer to show that this particular insured

expected or intended the result which occurred. The record does
not compel a finding that he did. It is just as likely that [the
insured], in his perverted way, might have thought that [the
victim] would derive some transitory pleasure or benefit from
what apparently would be his initial experience with
cocaine.2 °7
The Western District determined that the trial court had read the words "the
result" in the above passage as requiring a showing that the insured intended
2
the precise result that occurred before the insurer could escape liability. 1
However, the court of appeals read this passage as meaning that "the result"
was not a reference to the actual result only.2" Instead, the key is that the
court in Pacchettiwas trying to determine if the insured intended to benefit
or harm his victim. 210 If the insured was intending to benefit his victim,
there was no way any resulting hdrm could be intentional, whether it was

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 812-13.
Pacchetti,808 S.W.2d at 371.
Id. quoted in Easley, 847 S.W.2d at 813 (emphasis omitted).
Pacchetti,808 S.W.2d at 371, quoted in Easley, 847 S.W.2d at 813.
Easley, 847 S.W.2d at 813.
Id.
Id.
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death or severe brain damage.21 Thus, the Western District read Pacchetti
as requiring a harm/benefit analysis in terms of determining what "the result"
was.212 Therefore, the proper rule of law was not the subjective intent
approach from the second quoted paragraph.2 3 That statement applied to
the particular facts of the Pacchetticase. 2 4 The rule of Pacchettito use in
other cases is the one from the first quoted paragraph, the specific intent rule
requiring only a showing of intent to act and cause some harm.1 5
Easley argued that the Western District's decisions in Lacy"'6 and
Haste 7 were consistent with Pacchetti, and thus the trial court was correct
in following them. The court rejected this argument, stating that Lacy was of
no help because it reached the same result as in this case. The court clarified
Haste to make it consistent with this case.21 8 The court pointed to language
in Lacy which indicated that the court believed the analysis was that an
insured needed to show "not only that the insured intended the acts causing
' .
the injury, but also that injury was intended or expected from these acts."219
Thus, in Lacy, the court found no material issue of fact that the insured
intended his acts cause any harm, and therefore the policy exclusion was
inapplicable.' 0
Easley had pointed to dicta in the Haste decision which indicated that it

must be shown that an insured intended the precise results of his acts.
However, the Western District noted that the result in Haste was consistent
with the analysis and the rule adopted in the present case."' The Haste
court had drawn a distinction between the intent the insured had to cause predeath injuries and the lack of intent to cause death.' Because Bob Berdella
intended that pre-death injuries occur to his victims, the families could not
recover damages for those intended injuries from Economy Fire.'
With
respect to the deaths caused by Berdella, the issue was unresolved; the Haste

211. Id
212. Id
213. Id
214. Id

215. Id
216. American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lacy, 825 S.W.2d 306 (Mo. Ct. App.
1991).
217. Economy Fire and Casualty Co. v. Haste, 824 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. Ct. App.
1991).
218. Easley, 847 S.W.2d at 813. See infra notes 221-24 and accompanying text.
219. Id.
220. Id
221. Id
222. Id at 813-14.

223. Id at 814.
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court reversed and remanded the issue because the trial court had granted
summary judgment.' The Western District said that this analysis and result
were consistent with the rule of intent to harm adopted in Easley, and so
Haste was of no help.'
The court concluded by finding that Willmeno deliberately acted by
striking Easley and wanted to hurt him. 6 The court said, "That he wanted
to limit the injury to a bloody nose or blackened eye is of no consequence; all
that is required is that he intended to injure Easley." 7 American Family
successfully showed that Willmeno acted volitionally and with intent to
injure. 8 The court declared that American Family's policy did not cover
Willmeno's conduct because of the policy exclusion and because public policy
prevents "an insured from insuring against the consequences of his intentional
acts."' 9 The court concluded by reversing the trial court and entering
judgment for American Family."
V. COMMENT
The Western District's en banc opinion in Easley is a welcomed result.
The test of Pacchetti was applied much too narrowly in Lacy, Haste, and
L.D.G. With their erroneous focus on the sentence "it remains for the insurer
to show that this particular insured expected or intended the result which
occurred,"' 1' the three cases subsequent to Pacchetti effectively moved
Missouri into the subjective intent category by requiring proof of intent to
cause the actual resulting harm. 2 The Western District demonstrated why
focusing on this test was wrong. Because of that sentence's fact-specific
context in Pacchetti,the need arose to do a harm/benefit analysis to determine
Pacchetti's intent towards Derek Anderson. 3
The Western District ably showed that Pacchettireally did not digress
from the rule of law of all preceding Missouri cases. As quoted by the
Western District in Easley, Pacchettistill used the specific intent rule that "[i]t
must be shown not only that the insured intended the acts causing the injury,

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
at 45.
233.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Pacchetti,808 S.W.2d at 371.
L.D.G., 835 S.W.2d at 437; Lacy, 825 S.W.2d at 314; Haste, 824 S.W.2d
Easley, 847 S.W.2d at 813.
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but that injury was intended or expected from these acts. 034 Furthermore,
as the court pointed out, the wording in Pacchettimay have been subjective
intent language, but the analysis the Pacchetticourt carried out was a specific
intent analysis: did Mr. Pacchetti intend to harm or to benefit his victim? 5
If he intended to benefit Anderson, there was no intent to harm and there
would be insurance coverage. If he intended to harm Anderson, however, this
would provide the intent necessary to allow invocation of the exclusion clause.
Thus, the Pacchettimajority, in its outcome, in essence followed and approved
the specific intent rule. 6 As interpreted and used by the Easley court, the
traditional Missouri rule continues to be valid: an insurer must show only that
the insured intended his act and intended that some harm result in order to
decline coverage under the exclusion clause."
Two courts applying Missouri law have followed this rule in post-Easley
cases. In B.B. v. ContinentalInsurance Co.,"8 the Eighth Circuit United
States Court of Appeals, in a case involving the sexual molestation of a minor,
upheld the district court's ruling that the insurance policy denied coverage for
the perpetrator's acts. In interpreting the standard "intended or expected"
language to deny coverage, the court decided that Missouri would adopt an
inferred intent standard when the sexual abuse of children was involved.239
The Eighth Circuit also noted that the Easley court had rejected the L.D.G.
panel's requirement that the insurer show that the specific result had been
intended by the insured.24 And in Monsanto Company v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co.,24 the Superior Court of Delaware noted that Easley made it
clear that the Missouri Supreme Court, in Pacchetti,was requiring that if

intent to cause harm was shown, even if the harm was of a different type from
what was intended, coverage could be denied under an "intended or expected"
clause.24
The simple facts in Easley are excellent for a look at the issues
surrounding the definition of an intent to harm for purposes of an intentional
acts exclusion clause. It would seem that many of the difficulties presented
by Pacchetti and the succeeding cases arose from their unusual fact pat-

234. Id. (quoting Pacchetti,808 S.W.2d at 371).
235. Pacchetti,808 S.W.2d at 371; Easley, 847 S.W.2d at 813.
236. See supranotes 203-215 and accompanying text.
237. Easley, 847 S.W.2d at 812-13. This rule would, of course, have to include
the ability for a court to infer intent from the nature of the act if appropriate, as was
allowed in pre-Pacchetticases.
238. 8 F.3d 1288 (8th Cir. 1993).
239. Id at 1294.
240. Id at 1294-95.
241. No. 88C-JA-118, 1993 WL 542431 (Del. Super. Ct., Dec. 9, 1993).
242. Id at *7, *9.
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terns.243 An even starker hypothetical than the facts in Easley can be useful
in discussing the appropriate limits of "intent to harm."
For example, J, unprovoked, shoots several people. Some die, some are
only injured. What should the insurer of J have to show to invoke the
exclusionary language in its policy so that it won't be liable for any of J's
acts? 2' Should insurer have to show only that J intended to shoot the
victims and cause them injury? Or should insurer have to show J intended to
kill those who died and only wound those who were wounded? The early
interpretations of Pacchettiwould indicate that the subjective intent of J to do
what she did to each victim would have to be proven.245 However, the test
of Easley only requires Insurer to show that J intended to shoot her victims
and intended to cause them harm.' Insurer would not have to differentiate
between J's subjective intent regarding the specific result to each victim. In
fact, Travelers Insurance Co. v. Cole, 7 would suggest that firing a gun is
such a dangerous act that intent to harm can be inferred from the nature of the
act.2 8 In such a case, J would be liable and not insured for all "natural and
probable consequences of J's dangerous acts."249
Easley's return to the specific intent test returns Missouri to the national
majority in how to interpret these clauses." 0 Use of the specific intent test
is probably fairest to all persons involved. Insurer's favor an objective test,

243. The old adage "hard cases make bad law" certainly applies here, when
dealing with a cocaine injection, serial murderer, high speed car chase, and sexual
abuse.
244. Provided that J is sane.
245. E.g., Lacy, 825 S.W.2d at 314 (focusing on the test from Pacchetti: "It
remains for the insurer to show that this particular insured expected or intended the
result which occurred."); Haste, 824 S.W.2d at 45 (utilizing the same language from
Pacchettiin defining the requirement "the insurer must show that the insured expected
or intended the result which occurred"); L.D.G., 835 S.W.2d at 437 (citing the same
Pacchetti language requiring intent as to exact result).
246. Easley, 947 S.W.2d at 812-13.
247. 631 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
248. Id at 664-65. This would be consistent with past cases involving dangerous
acts, especially the line of cases dealing with the sexual abuse of children. See B.B.

v. Continental Ins. Co., 8 F.3d 1288 (8th Cir. 1993); supra note 7.
249. Cole, 631 S.W.2d at 664; Subscribers at the Auto. Club Inter-Ins. Exchange
v. Kennison, 549 S.W.2d 587, 590-91 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). See also Hanover Ins.
Co. v. Newcomer, 585 S.W.2d 285, 288-89 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (citing cases with
"substantial certainty" as test for inferring intent for result of act). Using the "natural
and probable consequences" language opens up possibilities for excluding negligence
or recklessness, but this test could be limited only to dangerous acts, as in the Cole
case.

250. See Wilcox, supra note 8, at 1538; Rigelhaupt, supra note 4, at 973.
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as it lets them deny coverage for any result of an intentional act"21

The

objective test is measured by what reasonable persons would foresee as the
results of their acts, and could be used to preclude coverage for negligent
acts. 2 Victims favor a purely subjective test, which allows coverage unless
the defendant admits intent to cause the actual results of her act.253 The
specific intent test is the closest thing to a middle ground and is the fairest to
both parties.
Liability insurance provides a fund a wrongdoer may use to pay her just
obligations and serves as a pool of resources to provide compensation to a
victim. 4 As discussed above, however, public policy cannot allow
insurance to pay for the results of a wrongdoer's intentional acts, as it would
allow wrongdoers to avoid taking responsibility for their acts. 5 The
criminal justice system may make some wrongdoers take some responsibility,
but it does very little to compensate the victims. The specific intent test is the
fairest way to determine when coverage is due because it serves several policy
goals.
First, the specific intent test serves the goals of deterrence and punishment for many situations, as it would put the burden of a wrongdoer's acts on
the wrongdoer, and not force the insurer to pay for the intentionally wrongful
acts of its insured.
Second, the specific intent test lets insurers know that when they put an
exclusion clause into a policy, they can readily predict what types of acts and
results will be considered intentional. By looking at a state's case law, and
using common sense, an insurance company can form a reasonable basis of
expectation for what it will have to cover. Thus, it will have the financial
stability it needs to write policies to cover only what it wants to cover and be
able to set an appropriate premium." The specic intent test eliminates the
situation many insurance companies found themselves in after Pacchetti:
practically requiring defendants to admit on the stand that they intended the
exact results of their actions. This is ridiculously unfair for an insurer, as very
few policyholders will cut their own throats and lose their coverage. It leaves
insurers in the position of either risking huge bad-faith judgments if they deny
coverage, or paying their policy limits in many more cases than they had
intended.
Third, the specific intent test is also fair to victims and serves the policy
goals of providing compensation to them. Strategically, it is not as good for

251.
252.
253.
254.

See Wilcox, supra note 8, at 1538.
Id at 1538-39.
See id
Cyperstein, supra note 5, at 23.

255. Id

256. Id at 24. See also infra text accompanying notes 259-260.
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plaintiffs as the subjective intent test because it denies coverage for more
claims. It does leave many victims uncompensated because the insurer must

only prove an intent to harm.

7

However, it is much better than the

objective test the insurers prefer, which would eliminate most claims based on
intentional or reckless acts, and even some acts of negligence. 8 The
specific intent standard is a test plaintiffs can readily use to analyze and plan
their cases, because it provides a relatively clear way to predict whether an
insurance company will be successful in denying coverage to the defendant.
Because the specific intent test provides a known standard for insurers to
apply in writing their policies, it helps victims by ensuring that liability
insurance will still be available. 9 The subjective intent test would actually
hurt all insurance consumers, not just victims, because of its financial
ramifications on insurers. To cover claims which could not be excluded
because of a subjective intent standard, insurers would have to either raise
everyone's premium, or lower the coverage amounts in most policies. Victims
would also be hurt by the subjective intent test they crave, because insurers
might begin writing policies that deny coverage for all "reasonably foreseeable" consequences or some other low standard, thus eliminating insurance
coverage now available for plaintiffs to count on.2" The specific intent test
is one that plaintiffs can count on to ensure that insurance coverage will be
available for them to make claims against.
Part of the problem with these exclusion clauses was created by the
insurance industry itself because companies want to use one standard,
nationwide contract. Now that the case law interpreting these clauses in
Missouri has been cleaned up, insurers who don't like the rule have several
choices to make. First, because Missouri has reaffirmed that it stands with the
majority of states in interpreting these clauses, the insurance companies are
safe in assuming that the rule will not change in the near future. They can
accept this interpretation, and base their projections about costs, payouts, and
premiums on this standard. Second, they could begin to write custom
257. Wilcox, supra note 8, at 1528.
258. Missouri case law helps victims by its requirement that intent to harm be
proven in some subjective way. Monsanto, 1993 WL 542431 at *7.
259. If the subjective intent test was the rule, insurance companies would have
to write very restrictive policies to deny coverage when they did not want to provide
it. They would probably do this either by using very narrow definitions of what a
policy covers, thus eliminating coverage for many acts now insured, or by adopting
new standards for denying coverage.
260. See, e.g., the cited policy language using the "reasonably foreseeable" test
in Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. L.D.G., 835 S.W.2d 436,437 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). Using
a reasonable person standard in the language adopts the objective test; which converts
negligent acts to intentional acts and precludes coverage. Wilcox, supra note 8, at
1539.
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insurance policies for each state to reflect whatever standard they want,
probably a reasonably foreseeable standard. They run the risk, however, of
the courts ignoring these new clauses as part of a contract of adhesion.26
Finally, because most courts now treat "expect" and "intend" as part of the
same clause, changing policy language may not be the best course for
insurance companies. Their best choice may be to lobby for statutory relief
in the form of a statute denying insurance coverage for intended harm.262
VI. CONCLUSION
The result in Easley is a fair one. The law has gone back to giving
insurers a clear, fair test for determining when they aren't liable for acts they
never intended for their policies to cover. It is fair to plaintiffs, because it
does not create a broad test eliminating coverage for all foreseeable results of
intentional acts, thus eliminating many viable claims. Although some
plaintiffs will get stuck trying to collect from insolvent defendants because the
deep pocket of the insurance company has been eliminated, the need for
predictability for the insurance industry outweighs this problem. Some victims
of intentional torts will be left worse off than victims of negligent acts by the
specific intent rule. But the insurance company is not the wrongdoer, and it
should not have to pay in every case. The company is a third party that has
agreed to pay for the acts of its insured in certain circumstances, and it has the
right to define what those circumstances will be. To get around the specific
intent rule, many plaintiffs will try to plead recklessness or negligence to
render the intentional acts exclusion inapplicable.263 This is a potential
problem, and courts will need to look to the substance of a plaintiff's claim
over its form to see if intentional acts are really involved. If they are,
Missouri courts have a clear and fair test for determining if the intentional acts
exclusion clause will apply.

JAMES E. BERGER

261. See Wilcox, supranote 8, at 1529, 1538 n.92. Cf L.D.G., 835 S.W.2d at
439 (Hanna, J., concurring).
262. See Alvey, supranote 7, at 574.
263. Cyperstein, supra note 5, at 18-19.
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